The Franchise and the Tax Power: Voting Rights and Economic Inequality

Abstract

This article examines the historical relationship between economic inequality and democratic governance, arguing that extreme economic inequality poses a fundamental threat to constitutional democracy. Sitaraman traces how the American constitutional system was designed for a society with a relatively broad middle class, and explores the implications of rising inequality for democratic institutions. The analysis draws on constitutional history, comparative law, and political theory to argue that constitutional systems that fail to address extreme inequality tend toward either oligarchy or revolution, and that the American system requires structural reforms to prevent economic power from translating into political domination.

Key Findings

• The American Constitution was designed for a society of relative economic equality
• Extreme inequality tends to undermine democratic institutions and constitutional norms
• Campaign finance law and voting rights protections are essential bulwarks against oligarchy
• Constitutional democracy requires structural limits on the political influence of concentrated wealth

Related Statutes

• Voting Rights Act of 1965
• Federal Election Campaign Act
• Citizens United era campaign finance law

Related Cases

• Citizens United v. FEC (2010)
• Shelby County v. Holder (2013)
• Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966)