Governing the Commons: Institutions for Collective Action
Elinor Ostrom · Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis · 1990
Abstract
This groundbreaking work challenges the assumption that common-pool resources must be managed either through government regulation or privatization to avoid the 'tragedy of the commons.' Through extensive empirical research on irrigation systems, fisheries, forests, and other shared resources around the world, Ostrom demonstrates that communities can and do develop effective self-governing institutions. Ostrom identifies eight design principles that characterize successful common-pool resource institutions, providing a framework that has influenced environmental law, property theory, and regulatory design. The work earned Ostrom the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009.
Key Findings
- Communities can successfully self-govern common-pool resources without external regulation or privatization
- Eight design principles characterize successful commons institutions
- Neither pure government regulation nor pure privatization is always the optimal solution
- Local knowledge and participatory governance are essential to successful resource management
Related Statutes
- National Environmental Policy Act
- Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Act